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1. Introduction
Nowadays two-sided platforms are present in many aspects of our life. When
we pay with a debit or credit card in the gas station, when we search for a flight
ticket or a hotel in the web, when we buy a newspaper or simply go to the
shopping mall, we are having access or using a platform that allows us to connect
in a particular way with agents on the other side of the market. In general, the
more numerous these agents are the larger is our interest on the platform.1
However, in many cases the choice of the platform is also conditionated by
other circumstances like the identity of the agents that we are going to meet,
the brands that are offered inside the platform or our level of income. Think
of malls in a big city and sellers and buyers visiting them. On the sellers’
side, we observe that some brands are present in all of them, whereas others
are not. On the buyers’ side, buyers choose the mall they visit according to the
sellers they are intending to buy from. At the same time, expensive brands have
preferences about the type of buyers and locate in malls visited by high income
people. Finally, sellers belonging to the group of expensive brands choose to
group together in the same malls, although it makes competition between them
stronger.2 Consequently, we may think that heterogeneity of the customers on
each side of the market would play an important role in the formation of the
platforms, the type of platform that is going to arise and the prices that they
can set.
The recent and growing literature on two-sided platforms have largely con-
sidered models with network externalities in which members of each customer
group benefit if more members of the other customer group are on the same
platform.3 However, in many markets, agents’ decisions also affect the level of
quality offered by the platform and then other customers’ utilities, so that, a
quality externality takes place. The existence of this externality may help us
to explain why, although the presence of strong network externalities, it is not
common to observe concentration in industries based on two-sided platforms.
As Evans et al. (2005) remark, product differentiation may be an important
countervailing force working against concentration.
This paper proposes a model that allows for the two types of externalities,
the standard indirect network effect and the externality because of the quality
concern. There are two sides of the market, buyers and sellers. Sellers are of
two types, the sellers that offer a product of high quality and the sellers that
offer a low quality product. For the low type sellers we mantain the traditional
assumption that they only care about the mass of buyers that participate in
their platform. In contrast, we assume that high type sellers care about the
1Note what the advertisement of Mastercard says: "There are some things money can not
buy, for everything else there is Mastercard".
2To buy clothing in Madrid, for instance, a possible choice is between going to the Village
outlet, where we find Loewe or Versace, or going to the Factory outlet, to buy from Zara or
Mango. A similar phenomena is present in online travel platforms. In some of them only
low-cost airlines participate (see for instance, Terminal A, Cheap Flights), whereas big or
high-cost airlines participate in a different group of platforms (Lastminute, Travelprice).
3 See the classical papers of Armstrong (2004), Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2004).
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mass of buyers of a particular type and about the type of members on its own
side.4 ,5 Buyers are heterogeneous and care about the mass and type of sellers.
The first goal is to determine the conditions under which the network effect
is stronger than the quality effect so that concentration prevails (i.e., there is a
single active platform in equilibrium) and the conditions to have equilibria with
more than one active platform. We find that a sufficient condition to have a
concentrated market is that high type sellers do not care about the other sellers
in the platform.
A second goal is, working with a model where ex-ante platforms are equal,
to determine the conditions by which market equilibria can be characterized
by two platforms having different qualities, number of agents and prices.6 The
platforms’ quality is endogenously determined by the type of sellers they house,
so that the level of quality is increasing in the proportion of sellers of high
quality.7 We find that depending on parameter values there are equilibria where
sellers separate by type, equilibria where every seller multihomes, and equilibria
where low type singlehomes whereas high type multihomes.
We find that in any equilibrium where sellers singlehome and separate by
type, at least one type of sellers make zero profits. In addition, profits of the
platform that houses the low quality sellers are higher than or equal to profits
of the platform housing high quality sellers. For this equilibrium to exist, the
high quality sellers must strongly care about partners in the platform, and the
mass of lowest types of buyers must be large enough. We also find that there
are equilibria where low type sellers singlehome while high type multihome. We
show that in any of them profits of both platforms must be equal, although their
qualities are different. Finally, another kind of equilibrium that may emerge
is one with two identical platforms with each of them housing all the sellers.
Interestingly, the prices that they set and their profits could be different.
Two papers close to this one are Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004) and Dami-
ano and Li (2005). In the first one, authors model competition between two
platforms within a vertical differentiation framework. However, only network
effects matter in agents’ utility functions given that they assume that quality in
one market is endogenously determined by the size of the network in the other
market. In other words, the platform with the largest number of members on
side i, is seen by members on side j as a good of higher quality than the other
platform. In our model qualities are determined by the sellers’ products itself.
The model of Damiano and Li (2005) considers participants that care about
the identities of other participants and the quality of the matching is endoge-
4Pashigian and Gould (1998) analyse empirically the demand externalities existing among
stores in a shopping mall. They argue that there exist "anchor stores" (well known stores)
that create external economies to other stores.
5Any own side effect has been largely ignored in the literature. An exception is Nocke,
Peitz and Stahl (2004) who assume competition between sellers.
6A common feature in the literature is the presence of symmetric equilibria with identical
competing platforms setting the same prices, see Rochet and Tirole, 2003, and Armstrong and
Wright, 2004, Gabszewicz, et. al. (2001).
7Papers leading with platforms that differ in the normal Hotelling way include Armstrong
(2004), Armstrong and Wright (2004), Gabszewicz, et. al. (2004).
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nously determined. Despite this important similarity, there are three main dif-
ferences with our model. First, agents do not care about the mass on the other
side, that is, there are no network externalities between customers. Second,
agents of the two sides are assumed to not care about members on their own
side. Finally, in their model customers on each side singlehome while we allow
the sellers to multihome. These differences have important consequences on
price competition and the equilibria configurations that may arise. Whenever
platforms compete in prices simultaneously, their model only presents equilib-
ria in mixed strategies, whereas we find conditions under which pure strategies
equilibria indeed exist. Moreover, because sellers can multihome, competition
between platforms is less fierce in our model. In addition, in the Damiano and
Li’s model an equilibrium with a single active platform never arises, while we
find that because of the network effects, this is the unique equilibrium when
sellers do not care about partners in the platform.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model.
In section 3, we analyze equilibria considering that charges are zero to the
buyers. In section 4, we search for the equilibria when charges are zero to the
sellers. In section 5, we study some welfare considerations. Finally, we conclude
in section 6.
2. The model
We study platform price competition in an environment with endogenous ver-
tical differentiation. There are two ex-ante identical platforms operating in a
two-sided market. One side is a measure one of sellers and the other side is a
measure one of buyers. Platforms offer an access service that provides each side
with the possibility of connecting with agents on the other side. This service
conveys two characteristics for each side of the market: the quality of the plat-
form and the number (mass) of agents on the other market’s side participating
in the platform. The platforms set a charge to permit the access and then,
endogenously determine the characteristics of the service offered.
Buyers and sellers’ decisions consist of paying for the access to the platforms
or not. In particular, buyers are allowed to access only one platform (single-
home) while sellers can access both of them simultaneously (multihome). We
think of platforms in such a way that at a point of time a seller or a brand can
be present in more than one platform while a buyer has to choose one of them
to visit (malls are a good example).
The surplus that a buyer derives from access to a platform depends on the
number of sellers who join the platform and its quality. Buyers are heterogeneous
in the value they assign to the platform’s quality and homogeneous in their
valuations of the network. Specifically, a consumer of type θ has a willigness to
pay θqi+γNSi for a platform with quality q
i and a mass of sellers NSi , where γ
is the network parameter. We can interpret it as the benefit buyers enjoy from
interacting with each seller.8 Buyers act to maximize their surplus. Letting PBi
8Alternatively, the buyers have probability NSi to find the product they need.
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denote the price charged by platform i to the buyers, a buyer of type θ chooses
the platform for which
UBθi = θq
i + γNSi − PBi (1)
is the largest. If (1) is negative for both platforms, then a type θ buyer stays
out of the market.
Note that quality of the platform and mass of sellers are substitutes in the
surplus of the buyer9. Beyond the heterogeneity, all the buyers are more at-
tracted by both, the platform that houses the largest number of sellers and the
platform with the highest quality. Heterogenity determines differences in the
weights to each surplus component10 .
There are two type of sellers, the high type H, with measure x, and the low
type L with measure 1 − x (assume that x < 12). The quality of a platform
depends on the number of high type sellers relative to the total of sellers in the
platform, so that its value belongs to the interval qi  [0, 1]. In particular, it
takes value qL = 0 when the platform houses only low type sellers and value
qH = 1 when the platform accounts only for high type sellers. If the platform
houses all sellers its quality is qM = x.
We assume that θ is distributed according to a Burr type XII distribution11
with parameter λ:
θ ∼ F (θ) = 1−
·
1− θ − θ
θ − θ
¸ 1
λ
;λ ≥ 0, θ  Θ =
£
θ, θ
¤
and θ ≥ 0.
The value of λ identifies the level of concentration around high or low values
of θ. In particular, if λ = 1, θ is uniformly distributed. If λ > 1, high valuation
consumers are more numerous than low valuation consumers and the opposite
occurs if λ < 1. If λ = 0, distribution becomes degenerate at θ = θ. For
simplicity, we assume θ − θ = 1.
We define the mass of sellers (sellers’ demand) on each platform according
to
NSi = N
H
i +N
L
i
where NHi and N
L
i are the mass of sellers of type H and type L in platform
i, respectively. We denote the mass of buyers (buyers’ demand) that visit the
platform i by NBi .
The net utility of sellers that only go to platform i is equal to
Usi = V
s(qi, NBi ) +N
B
i (β
s)− PSi s = H, L (2)
9Notice that our representation of buyers’ population and of their preferences is reminiscent
of the well-known model of vertical product differentiation. At the same time, it is a more
general case of Armstrong’s model with membership fees.
10 It may be better understood if it is interpreted as a heterogeneity in income instead of
preferences. A priori every buyer values the high quality products but before visiting the
platform they anticipate the purchases they can make, so that θ is the result of a problem
previously solved by the buyer (as an indirect utility function).
11Burr type XII distribution has been used by Basaluzzo et al. (2005).
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and the utility of sellers that multihome is equal to Usi + U
s
j .
Note that sellers are heterogeneous in two dimensions; first, in the value they
assign to platform’s quality modeled by the function V s(qi, NBi ). The sellers of
the high type care about their partners in the platform, which can be interpreted
as a "reputation effect". In particular, V H(qi, NBi ) is assumed to be increasing
and concave in qi and constant in NBi , with V
H(qi, NBi ) ≥ qi and V H(0,NBi ) =
V H(qi, 0) = 0. The low type sellers do not perceive any reputation effect and
V L(qi,NBi ) = 0 for all q
i, NBi . In what follows when we write V (q
i), we are
refering to V H(qi, NBi ) given N
B
i > 0, i.e., to the valuation for the platform’s
quality of the high type sellers.
The parameters βH and βL determine the type of buyers that sellers are
interested in, where NBi (β
s) is a function defined by
NBi (β
s) = P (θ ≥ βs) for all θ s.t. UBθi ≥ max{UBθj , 0}.
It follows that NBi (β
s) ≤ NBi .
Without loss of generality we assume that βL = θ and βH [θ, θ]. It implies
that low quality sellers value any type of buyer, whereas high type sellers only
perceive utility from the buyers in the platform whose types are in the intervalh
βH , θ
i
. In other words, NBi (θ) = N
B
i is the complete mass of buyers visiting
platform i and NBi (β
H) is the mass of buyers visiting platform i of the type
that high type sellers are interested in.
We rewrite the utility functions of each type of seller, using the simplified
notation described above as
UHi = V (q
i) +NBi (β
H)− PSi (3)
and
ULi = N
B
i − PSi . (4)
Note that, inside each group, sellers are homogeneous and that network and
reputation (quality) effects are substitutes in (3) .12
Platforms face no cost and they can not discriminate in prices within a side
of the market. Their profits are given by
Πi = P
B
i N
B
i + P
S
i N
S
i
The reasoning behind our modelling strategy is similar to that in Gabszewicz
and Wauthy (2004). From the viewpoint of a seller, the willigness to pay to
access a platform depends on her own type and the number of additional sales
this seller expects to realize in the platform. All of them are conditionated by
the number and type of buyers and sellers participating in the platform. From
the viewpoint of the buyers, the willigness to pay to visit the platform depends
on the buyers’ type and on the number of purchases that they expect to make
12The utility function of the sellers is a more general case of Armstrong’s model with an
additional component of quality.
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because of the platform. It depends on the number and types of sellers housed
by it.
The timing of the game is the following: in the first stage platforms set prices,
in the second stage sellers observe prices and decide their locations. Finally,
buyers observe sellers’ locations and prices, they infer platforms’ quality and
choose the one they visit. We search for the subgame perfect equilibria of this
sequential game.
We proceed to solve the game in two different settings. When only sellers
are charged with a positive price and when only buyers are.
3. Charges are zero to the buyers
Consider the malls in a big city. Buyers can visit them and get the benefit of
finding several shops together but, simultaneously, they also have access to the
same shops or brands in an important street of the city at price zero. Given this
situation we assume that platforms can not set positive prices for the buyers.13
To better understand a platform with an outside option free of charge think of a
platform without it. The credit card is a typical example, there is no substitute
for the service that it offers to the buyers.
We solve the game by backward induction. First we solve the buyers’ prob-
lem, then we solve the sellers’ subgame and finally the platforms’ problem. In
the third stage, each buyer takes the decision that maximizes her utility given
her type. In the second stage, we search for the Nash Equilibrium location of
the sellers. In the first stage, the basic equilibrium concept is used: no platform
has an incentive to change prices given the other’s prices.
3.1 The buyers’ problem
At the third stage of the game, each buyer decides on visiting platform 1 or
platform 2 according to the buyer’s payoff (1) .We assume that the strategy of
not participating in any platform yields a zero payoff to any buyer14 . Sellers have
already been located in stage 2 and qualities of the platforms are known in the
last stage. Buyers may hence face one of the three following possible situations:
1) Two active platforms with different qualities, 2) Two active platforms with
the same quality, and 3) A single active platform.
Two active platforms with qi > qj . For each
¡
NSi , N
S
j
¢
we define θ∗ as the
buyer who is indifferent between visiting platform i and platform j, i.e.,
13Pashigian, B and Gould, D. (1988), note that shopping malls charge nothing for access to
buyers whereas they collect rent from retailers. Hagiu, A (2005), finds that the sellers side
pays relatively more when the "intensity" of buyers’ preferences for variety is higher and gives
examples such as shopping malls or priceline.com where buyers are not charged to access the
platform.
14Given that PBi = 0 for all i, the strategy of not visiting any platform is weakly dominated
as θqj + γNSj ≥ 0, where qj < qi.
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θ∗ = min{θ, γ
¡
NSj −NSi
¢
(qi − qj) }. (5)
Consequently, the mass of buyers in platform i is given by NBi = 1−F (θ∗) and
the mass in platform j is given by NBj = 1−NBi = F (θ
∗) .
Two particular cases will be of importance in the analysis that follows. If all
sellers singlehome but separate by type, such that one platform has quality qH =
1 and the other one has quality qL = 0, θ∗ will be equal to min{θ, γ (1− 2x)}
and we will denote it by θ∗S . If low type sellers singlehome but high type sellers
multihome, θ∗ will be equal to min{θ, γ} and we will denote it by θ∗HM .
We introduce an additional assumption: γ < θ. It means that the network
parameter is lower than the highest type of buyers. This is necessary in order
to find equilibria where buyers separate by platform. Note that if, for instance,
θ < γ (1− 2x) , all the buyers will visit only one platform and they will never
separate because the network effect would be too strong.
Two active platforms with qi = qj . Two configurations may arise. If NSi >
NSj , then N
B
i = 1 and N
B
j = 0, whereas if N
S
i = N
S
j , then N
B
i = N
B
j =
1
2 .
A single active platform j with qj . Every buyer will visit this platform,
so that NBj = 1.
3.2 The sellers’ problem
At the second stage sellers decide where to locate: at one of the two platforms,
at both platforms or at none of them, once the prices have been already set in
the first stage. We assume that the strategy of not participating in any platform
yields a zero payoff to both types of sellers.
Sellers type s go to platform i (singlehome in i) if and only if
Usi ≥ max{Usj , Usi + Usj , 0}, s = H, L
and they multihome if and only if
Usi + U
s
j ≥ max{Usi , Usj , 0}, s = H, L
Since the sellers’ decisions may induce multiple equilibria, at this stage we
will concentrate on symmetric equilibria inside each seller group, i.e., sellers of
a given type follow the same strategy.15
To simplify notation, we write the locations of sellers as “LiHj” to refer to a
location where the type L sellers follow the strategy i and type H sellers follow
15 In addition, these equilibria are robust to coalitional deviation, so that they satisfy the
Strong Nash refinement: choices by platforms for which no subgroup of sellers can deviate by
changing strategies jointly in a manner that increases payoffs to all its members, given that
non-members stick to their original choice. Due to the network effects, we only need to check
for deviations by the grand coalition, i.e., by all the sellers of a given type.
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the strategy j, where i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, M}, i.e., sellers either do not go to any plat-
form, or go to platform 1, to platform 2 or multihome. So, for instance, L1H1,
means that both type of sellers only go to platform 1; L1HM means that type L
sellers go to platform 1 and type H multihome.
Furthermore, we introduce here an additional notation which simplifies the
exposition: M = 1−F (βH), T1 = 1−F (γ (1− 2x)) , T2 = 1−F (γ) and Dq =
V (qH) − V (qM ). Note that M is the value that the high type sellers attach to
the network, that is, the utility that the mass of buyers with θ‘s higher than βH
yield to the high type sellers. T1 is the mass of buyers that go to the platform
with the highest quality when sellers separate by type. T2 is the mass of buyers
that go to the platform with the highest quality when low type sellers go to
one platform while high type sellers multihome. Note that T1 and T2 are well
defined as γ < θ. Finally, Dq is the extra benefit, in terms of reputation for the
high type sellers, of sharing the platform only with sellers of their type instead
of also sharing the platform with the low type sellers.
The sellers’ decisions give rise to three kinds of possible equilibrium config-
urations: singlehoming with separation by type, multihoming and a dominant
platform equilibrium. In what follows we proceed to characterize these struc-
tures. At this stage, we call platform 2 the platform that sets the higher price,
i.e., PS2 ≥ PS1 .
Separating equilibrium
There is a "separating equilibrium" whenever all the sellers singlehome and
separate by type in platforms so that in equilibrium there is one platform with
the highest possible quality and another one with the lowest possible quality.
Proposition 1 If Dq < T1 or 1− T1 < V (qM ) there is no separating equilib-
rium
Proof. First, consider the case where βH > γ (1− 2x) . In a separating
equilibrium configuration as LiHj, sellers’ profits are given by UHj = V (q
H) +
M − PSj and ULi = (1− T1)− PSi . High type sellers will not deviate whenever
V (qH) +M − PSj ≥ max{V (qM ) +M − PSi , V (qH) + V (qM ) +M − PSi − PSj },
which requires PSj − PSi ≤ Dq and PSi ≥ V (qM ) to hold. Similarly, low type
sellers will not deviate whenever
(1− T1)− PSi ≥ 1− PSj ,
which requires PSj − PSi ≥ T1. Participation constraints impose PSi ≤ 1 − T1
and PSj ≤ V (qH) +M.
Consider now the case βH < γ (1− 2x) .Conditions for the low type sellers do
not change, whereas high type sellers’ profits are now given by UHj = V (q
H) +
T1 − PSj . High type sellers will not deviate whenever
V (qH) + T1 − PSj ≥ max{V (qM ) +M − PSi , V (qH) + V (qM ) +M − PSi − PSj },
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which requires PSj − PSi + F (γ (1− 2x)) − F
³
βH
´
≤ Dq and PSi ≥ V (qM ) +
F (γ (1− 2x))− F (βH) to hold.
Hence, it follows that V (qH)−V (qM ) ≥ T1 and 1−T1 ≥ V (qM ) are necessary
conditions to be satisfied.16
Remarks about separation and heterogeneity
Note that a necessary condition as claimed for a separating equilibrium is
that the extra benefit that high type sellers obtain in a separating equilibrium
compared with a situation where both types of sellers are together, measured
by Dq, is larger than the cost that a separating equilibrium has on low type
sellers in terms of network, measured by T1, the difference in potential clientele
between a separating equilibrium and a situation where all sellers are together.
Thus, if Dq = 0 a separating equilibrium can not exist as 0 < T1. Further-
more, the reputation effect has to be sufficiently higher when they do not share
the platform with the low type sellers than when they do. The intuition is that
when type H sellers do not care enough about their partners in the platform,
only network effects matter and, as expected, concentration prevails. To have
a separating equilibrium a countervailing force such as platform endogenous
quality differentiation is then necessary.
Note also that buyers’ heterogeneity is crucial for a separating equilibrium to
exist because without this heterogeneity buyers would never have an incentive
to separate.
In addition, if preferences about buyers are equal for both types of sellers
then again the network effect would prevail and separation is not possible. To
see this, note that under βH = θ, in a location LiHj profits to the sellers are
given by UHj = V (q
H) + T1 − PSj and ULi = (1− T1) − PSi . High type sellers
will not deviate whenever
V (qH) + T1 − PSj ≥ V (qH) + V (qM ) + 1− PSi − PSj
which requires PSi ≥ V (qM ) + (1− T1) to hold, a condition that violates the
one imposed by the participation constraint, PSi ≤ 1− T1.
The next proposition presents the general conditions that guarantee the
existence of a separating equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Let βH > γ (1− 2x) . There is a separating equilibrium L1H2 if
and only if T1 ≤ PS2 −PS1 < Dq, V (qM ) ≤ PS1 ≤ 1−T1 and PS2 ≤ V (qH)+M.
Proof. The statement that a configuration of equilibrium L1H2 implies
these conditions on prices follows directly from the proof of proposition 1. The
implication in the other direction is shown in Appendix A.
The difference between the prices set by the high and the low quality plat-
forms has to compensate for the loss in terms of buyers for the type L sellers of
being separated (T1) , and has to be lower than the benefit that type H sellers
16Note that conditions are more stringent when βH < γ (1− 2x) . This is due to the fact
that in this case network effects for the high type sellers are stronger.
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obtain in terms of reputation (Dq) . The price in the low quality platform must
be higher than V (qM ) to avoid the multihoming strategy of the high type sell-
ers. The rest of the conditions come from the participation constraints. Under
symmetric conditions on prices there is a separating equilibrium like L2H1.
Equilibria involving multihoming
There are three strategy profiles that can generate an equilibrium involving
multihoming. They are LMHM at which both types multihome (global multi-
homing from now on), LiHM with i 6=M, at which only high types multihome
(H multihoming from now on) and the LMHi with i 6= M, at which only low
types multihome (L multihoming from now on). We first show that the last
strategy profile is never an equilibrium configuration.
Lemma 1 There is no L multihoming equilibrium in pure strategies
Note that if type H sellers are in platform i, going to this platform generates
a benefit 1 − P si for type L while multihoming yields 1 − P si − P sj . So, given
that type H sellers are located in one platform, the strategy LM will never be a
best response. Also, if type L sellers decide to multihome, platform i will have a
level of quality qM , while the platform with only type L sellers will have quality
qL. No buyer will visit platform j given that it will have a lower quality and a
lower number of sellers.
Nevertheless, global multihoming and H multihoming are equilibrium con-
figurations as shown in next propositions.
Proposition 3 There is a global multihoming equilibrium if and only if PS1 +
PS2 ≤ 1 and PS2 ≤ min{T2, V (qM )}
Proof. See appendix A.
The first condition comes from the participation constraint of the low type
sellers. They will multihome if the benefit of doing so, i.e., the access to every
buyer, at least compensates for the cost of participating in both platforms. In
addition, both prices must be lower than the extra benefit that multihoming
generates to both types of sellers compared to the benefit of participating in
only one platform (T2 for the low type sellers and V (qM ) for the high type
sellers).
This result does not change if high sellers’ preferences about buyers are like
the ones of the low type sellers. In other words, the same result remains true if
βH = βL = θ.
Proposition 4 There is a H multihoming equilibrium L1HM if and only if
PS1 ≤ min{1− T2, V (qM )} and T2 ≤ PS2 ≤ V (qH)
Proof. See appendix A.
In an equilibrium like this, the quality of platform 1 is qM while in platform
2 is qH . To attract the low type buyers, the price in platform 1 must be lower
than the one in platform 2, and PS2 must be larger than the extra benefit (T2)
that would accrue to the low type sellers by multihoming. Note that, if low type
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sellers are in platform 1, the high type can ensure access to the buyers that they
are interested in by locating in any of the two platform. They will participate
in a second platform if it implies an extra positive pay off and so, prices in each
platform must be lower than the corresponding values in terms of reputation i.e.
PS1 ≤ V (qM ) and PS2 ≤ V (qH). Finally, the condition PS1 ≤ 1− T2 comes from
the low type sellers’ participation constraint. Under the symmetric conditions
on prices there is a H multihoming equilibrium L2HM.
This result remains true if high type sellers’ preferences about buyers are
like those of the low type.
Dominant platform equilibrium
There is a "dominant platform equilibrium" if both types of sellers single-
home in the same platform. In this equilibrium there is only one active platform
with medium quality.
Proposition 5 There is a dominant platform equilibrium L1H1 if and only if
PS2 − PS1 ≥ Dq, PS1 ≤ min{1, V (qM ) +M} and PS2 ≥ V (qH).17 .
Proof. See appendix A.
For high type sellers to stay in the active platform, the difference in prices
must compensate for the difference in terms of reputation between strategies
H1 and H2. Other restrictions on PS1 arise from the participation constraints.
Finally, the condition PS2 ≥ V (qH) ensures that the high type sellers are deterred
from multihoming. Under symmetric prices there is a L2H2 equilibrium.
We have here only shown the pure strategies equilibria.18 The mixed strate-
gies equilibria are discussed in appendix B.
In figure 1 we present the map of equilibria at the sellers’ stage, given the
prices set by the platforms.19 The figure shows clearly the necessity of conditions
in proposition 1 to have separation. As Dq and T1 tend to get close to each
other, separation becomes unlikely. The same occurs when 1− T1 and V
¡
qM
¢
get close. Whenever λ > 1, the distribution function stochastically dominates
the uniform distribution so that T1 is larger than in the case of λ = 1. The
contrary occurs if λ < 1. Then, the more concentrated the buyers’ distribution
is around the higher types, the less likely it is that separation emerges. Note
that the mass of high type sellers, x, affects T1 directly, so that a smaller mass
of high type sellers facilitates separation. On the contrary, changes in γ affect
T1 negatively and make separation more likely. It may appear counterintuitive
that a higher buyers’ valuation for the network facilitates buyers separation.
This is due to the fact that the low quality platform has a higher mass of buyers
(1− x > x by assumption) . Thus, if γ increases, the utility that this platform
generates is higher for every buyer, and more buyers will decide to visit this
17The condition PS2 − PS1 ≥ Dq is relaxed to PS2 − PS1 ≥ Dq −
£
F (γ (1− 2x)− F
¡
βH
¢¤
whenever βH < γ (1− 2x) .
18Note that there are other potential equilibrium configurations that we have not defined:
the L0Hi and the LiH0, i {0, 1, 2,M}.
19To construct figure 1 we have to restrict to some conditions on parameters. In particular,
we consider that conditions to have a separating equilibrium are satisfied, and V
¡
qM
¢
> T1.
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Figure 1: The Nash Equilibria at the sellers’ stage
platform. Then T1 decreases, and consequently the cost for the low type sellers
of being separated is smaller.
As long as T2 is large, the global multihoming equilibrium is more likely. The
impact of λ and γ on T2 are analogous to those explained for T1. Recall that
T2 is the cost for the low type sellers of staying in only one platform, compared
with the benefit of the multihoming strategy, when high type multihome.
For the high type sellers, the value they assign to each strategy is mainly
conditionated by the value that they assign to V
¡
qH
¢
versus V
¡
qM
¢
. Given
that V
¡
qM
¢
represents the cost for the high type sellers of being separated and
not multihoming, if V
¡
qM
¢
is sufficiently high, an equilibrium where low type
sellers singlehome and high type multihome is more likely than a separating
equilibrium. The contrary occurs if V
¡
qM
¢
is negligible.
3.3 Platforms’ problem
Each platform i sets the price PSi that maximizes
Πi = P
S
i N
S
i
Depending on parameters and platforms’ choices, different market configu-
rations can arise in equilibrium. In this section we are interested in the con-
ditions under which the equilibria that we have defined and analyzed for the
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sellers’ stage can also arise in the first stage when platforms decide prices. We
concentrate on the number of platforms and the level of quality that arise in
equilibrium. First, we analize the dominant platform equilibrium where there is
only a single active platform with quality qM . Second, we present the equilibria
with the two active platforms: the global multihoming where the level of quality
is qM in both platforms, the H multihoming with one platform with quality qM
and another one with quality qH , and the separating equilibrium with qualities
qH and qL.
A single active platform with quality qM
The next proposition presents the necessary and sufficient conditions to have
a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium with a single active platform housing the
total mass of sellers.
Proposition 6 A single active platform with both types of sellers participat-
ing exists as a Subgame Perfect Dominant Platform Equilibrium if and only
if V (qH) = V (qM ) = 0. If βH > γ (1− 2x) prices are PS1 = PS2 = 0.
If βH < γ (1− 2x) prices are PS1 = min{T1,
h
F (γ (1− 2x))− F (βH)
i
} and
PS2 = 0.
Proof. First, we prove that the existence of a single active platform as a
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium implies that V (qH) = V (qM ) = 0.
Let V (qH) > V (qM ) and assume by contradiction that prices
¡
PS1 , P
S
2
¢
are such that sellers locate at L1H1. At this candidate Π2 = 0. Consider a
deviation to PS2 = V (q
H)−ε. At these prices the Nash Equilibrium is a location
L1HM and Π2 > 0, then location L1H1 can not be an equilibrium. Now, let
V (qH) = V (qM ) = V (q) > 0 and assume by contradiction that prices
¡
PS1 , P
S
2
¢
are such that sellers locate at L1H1. At this candidate Π2 = 0. Consider a
deviation to PS2 = V (q)− ε. At these prices the Nash Equilibrium is a location
L1HM and Π2 > 0, then location L1H1 can not be an equilibrium.
The statement that V (qH) = V (qM ) = 0 implies a dominant platform equi-
librium follows from Bertrand’s argument.
Under βH > γ (1− 2x) , if V (qH) = V (qM ) = 0 both plaforms yield the
same benefit (gross of prices) to the sellers and there is no difference between
the platforms. They compete to attract the sellers and equilibrium prices are
equal to the marginal cost of the platforms. There is no profitable deviation to
higher prices. Due to the network effects, even though prices are zero, sellers
locate all together in one platform.
Under βH < γ (1− 2x) , if low type sellers are located in platform 1, the best
reply of sellers type H is H1 as
h
1− F (βH)
i
− PS1 > [1− F (γ (1− 2x))]− PS2 .
If high type sellers are located in platform 1, the best reply of sellers type
L is L1 as 1− PS1 > 1− T1 − PS2 .
Platform one has the market power to set a price according to these differ-
ences once it attracts one type of the sellers and it does so. In equilibrium only
one platform will be active, as claimed.
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Proposition 6 remarks on the importance of the reputation effect in our
model. If high type sellers do not care about their partners in the platform,
there is only one possible equilibrium, the dominant platform equilibrium. The
network effects are the strongest and concentration prevails.20
Two active platforms with quality qi = qj = qM
In the following proposition we analyse the conditions to have a Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium where all the sellers participate in both platforms.
Proposition 7 If min{T2, V (qM )} ≤ 12 and V (qH)x < T2 there is a Subgame
Perfect Global Multihoming Equilibrium with prices PS∗1 = P
S∗
2 = min{T2, V (qM )}.
If min{T2, V (qM )} > 12 , there is a set of subgame perfect equilibria if PS1 +PS2 =
1 and xV (qH) < min{1− PS2 , 1− PS1 } are satisfied.
Proof. See appendix C.
From proposition 3 it follows that PS∗1 and P
S∗
2 are the maximum prices that
platforms can set whenever min{T2, V (qM )} ≤ 12 and participation constraint
of the low type sellers is trivially satisfied. In this case the platforms’ profits
are Π∗1 = Π
∗
2 = min{T2, V (qM )}, which must be higher than the benefits that
locations L1HM and L2HM would yield to the platforms, V (qH)x. This fact
generates the inequality V (qH)x < T2 (assumptions about V (qM ) ensures that
V (qH)x < V (qM ) always occurs). If the situation is that min{T2, V (qM )} > 12 ,
the participation constraint will optimally be satisfied with equality. Given that
profits of each platform will be Π1 = 1 − PS2 and Π2 = 1 − PS1 , any of them
should be larger than V (qH)x, which explains the last inequality. Note that
under condition min{T2, V (qM )} ≤ 12 , the equilibrium, if it exists, is unique.
Whereas, if min{T2, V (qM )} > 12 , there is a set of possible equilibria. In any
case xV (qH) must be necessarily lower than 12 . An interesting result here is
that equilibria where both platforms provide the same service to the sellers
but charge different prices and get different profits can arise, as the following
corollary states.
Corollary If min {T2, V (qM )} ≤ 12 , profits of both platforms in any LMHM
equilibrium are equal. If min{T2, V (qM )} > 12 , profits will be equal if and only
if PS1 = P
S
2 =
1
2
Two active platforms with qi > qj
We study now those equilibria which ensure two platforms with different
qualities to arise. In particular, those where low type sellers singlehome whereas
high type multihome and those where sellers separate by type. The former gives
rise to a platform with medium quality and another with high quality, whereas
the latter gives rise to a platform of high quality with another of low quality.
Before proceeding we present a lemma that characterizes the platforms mar-
ket behavior when sellers play mixed strategies, whose proof is the content of
Appendix B.
20 In Damiano and Li’s model, where no reputation effect exists and where the network effect
is absent, an equilibrium with a unique platform never arises.
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Lemma 2 Taking the other platform price as given, the market of any plat-
form when sellers play mixed strategies is non-decreasing (non-increasing) in its
own price whenever DqT1 ≥ (≤)
1−x
x .
The market is non decreasing, i.e., DqT1 ≥
1−x
x , only if V (q
M ) > T1, as V (qi)
is a concave function.
Note that, given the price of the other platform, the market of each platform
is increasing (constant) on its own price if the extra benefit of separation for
high type sellers times their total mass, Dqx, is higher than (equal to) the cost
of separation for the low type sellers times their mass, T1 (1− x) .
In the following proposition we present the conditions that have to be satis-
fied by the parameters to have an equilibrium where high type sellers multihome
and low type ones singlehome, with prices PS1 = V (q
M ) and PS2 = V (q
H). Since
for PS1 = V (q
M ) to be an equilibrium it is needed that (1− T2) > V (qM ) (see
proposition 4) in the next proposition we further assume that this condition
holds. The result is obtained for the case where DqT1 ≥
1−x
x satisfies.
Proposition 8 Let β > γ (1− 2x) . If xV (qH) = V (qM ) > (1− T1) (1− x) ,
there is a subgame perfect H multihoming equilibrium with prices PS∗1 = V (q
M )
and PS∗2 = V (q
H) and location of sellers L1HM.
Proof. See appendix C.
Note that condition xV (qH) = V (qM ) implies that both platforms get the
same profits. In this configuration of equilibrium, given the price of the rival,
each platform has the possibility of replicating the profit of the other one by
setting the other’s price (see the proof of the next proposition).
Condition V (qM ) > (1− T1) (1− x) arises as a necessary condition to avoid
any deviation of platform 1 to a configuration equilibrium as L1H2.
The proposition that follows characterizes the H multihoming equilibria.
Proposition 9 In any H multihoming equilibrium both platforms profits are
equal.
Proof. From proposition 4, we know that prices are going to be such that
PS1 ≤ min{1 − T2, V (qM ), PS2 } and PS2 ≤ V (qH). Note that in equilibrium
platforms will optimally charge prices PS1 = min{1 − T2, V (qM )} and PS2 =
V (qH). At any other price there exists a profitable deviation for at least one
of the platforms. Moreover, both platforms have the possibility of getting the
other platform’s profits by setting its price. Setting a price PS2 = min{1 −
T2, V (qM )} − ε platform 2 attracts low type sellers and gets the profits that
platform 1 obtains in the equilibrium. With a price PS1 = V (q
H)−ε platform 1
attracts high type sellers, loses low type sellers and gets the profits of platform
2 in equilibrium. These two deviations will not be profitable whenever profits
in equilibrium are equal, which shows the statement.
Note that if 1 − T2 > V (qM ), the condition is V (qM ) = xV (qH) and can
be satisfied if and only if V (qi) is a linear function. On the other hand, if
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1 − T2 < V (qM ), the condition that arises is 1 − T2 = xV (qH) and can be
satisfied for any concave function.
Corollary In any H multihoming equilibrium the price set by the high quality
platform is higher than the price set by the medium quality one
Finally, we study the conditions under which a separating equilibrium can
exist. We find that this is the equilibrium less likely to arise and several stringent
conditions should be satisfied. The following proposition presents some general
conditions that would make a separating equilibrium likely to exist.
Proposition 10 If x is sufficiently lower than (1− T1) a separating equilibrium
with location of sellers L1H2 and prices PS∗1 = (1− T1) and PS∗2 = V (qH)+M
may exist.
Proof. See appendix C.
Now, we characterize any separating equilibrium in the next lemma and
proposition.
Lemma 3 In any separating equilibrium, at least one platform makes positive
profits, so that a Bertrand like equilibrium never arises.
It follows from condition T1 ≤ PS2 −PS1 < Dq, which is a necessary condition
for separation as shown in proposition 2.
Proposition 11 In any separating equilibrium:
a) At least one type of sellers makes zero profits;
b) The price of the high quality platform is higher than the price of the low
quality platform;
c) Profits of the low quality platform are higher than or equal to profits of
the high quality platform.21
Proof. Let platform 1 be the low quality platform and platform 2 be the
high quality one.
a) The corresponding best response prices are: PS1 = min
¡
1− T1, PS2 − T1
¢
and PS2 = min
¡
V
¡
qH
¢
+M, PS1 +Dq
¢
. Now, assume that no type seller is at
the participation level, that is PS1 = P
S
2 − T1 and PS2 = PS1 +Dq. This is only
possible if Dq = T1 and we know from proposition 1 that a necessary condition
for a separating equilibrium is Dq > T1. So, in equilibrium PS1 = 1 − T1 or
PS2 = V
¡
qH
¢
+M as claimed in the proposition.
b) Suppose that platform 1 is the low quality platform and platform 2 the
high quality one. If PS2 = V
¡
qH
¢
+M the statement b) follows trivially as
V
¡
qH
¢
+M > 1 − T1 ≥ PS1 . If PS2 = PS1 +Dq, from statement a) we know
that PS1 = 1− T1. Consequently, PS2 = 1− T1 +Dq > 1− T1 = PS1 .
21Damiano and Li (2005) show that in a sequential-move game where platforms compete
in prices, under uniform type distribution, the platform that moves first chooses prices such
that this platform becomes the low quality one.
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c) The statement follows from two facts. On the one hand, the low quality
platform always has the possibility of getting the profits of the high type one
(whenever PS2 > 1−T1). Setting a price PS1 = PS2 −ε , platform 1 attracts type
H sellers, loses type L sellers and gets the profits of the high quality platform.
It would be a profitable deviation if the high quality platform had higher profits
than the low quality one. On the other hand, given PS1 , platform 2 can not
always replicate the situation of platform 1. This fact explains the asymmetry
between profits.
Remarks about price competition with multihoming and quality differentia-
tion
Since sellers are allowed to multihome they do not make an "either-or" de-
cision to join a platform. Because of this, competition between platforms is not
fierce as in Bertrand games and, in any equilibrium, prices to the sellers are
higher than the marginal cost. In fact, prices are close to the monopoly prices.
Note that this result is similar to the well known result of Armstrong (2004)
("competitive bottlenecks").22 However, when the reputation effect is absent,
even if sellers are allowed to multihome, the unique equilibrium involves a single
active platform, where the platform sets a price equal to the marginal cost when-
ever the network effect is weak for high type sellers (i.e., β > γ (1− 2x)).23 The
difference between Armstrong’s result and ours follows from the timing of the
game. Here buyers decide their location after observing sellers’ choices. Sellers
anticipate that if they group together, they will meet all the buyers. So that,
with no reputation effect, the strategy of multihoming will always be a dom-
inated one. When this occurs, platforms have incentives for "undercutting"
prices to "steal" sellers. In contrast, whenever the quality effects are present,
platforms have two types of pricing strategies.24 First, they can "lowering the
own price" to attract sellers. Aside from this usual strategy we identify an-
other one by which the platform with initially lower quality can "increase its
own price" to provide a higher level of quality.25 For instance, given a location
LMHM, platform 2 (1) would achieve a location L1HM (L2HM) by setting a
price higher than min{T2, V
¡
qM
¢} and lower than V ¡qH¢. By doing so, plat-
form 2 (platform 1) would offer a service of quality qH , higher than the initial
quality qM , and would attract the highest buyers. Something similar occurs
in locations L1HM and L1H2. In both cases, the low quality platform could
increase its price to expel the low type sellers while keeping the high types. In
this way, this platform becomes of the same quality as its rival. Once this is the
case, location L0H1 might emerge.
22 It says that the singlehoming side is treated favorably compared with the multihoming
side. For computational simplicity, we have assumed that prices are zero for the singlehoming
side, but we conjecture that it may arise as an equilibrium result.
23Recall, from proposition 6 that prices are PS1 = min{T1,
£
F (γ (1− 2x))− F (βH)
¤}, PS2 =
0 if β < γ (1− 2x) .
24Although this kind of analyses is not totally correct in a static enviroment with simulta-
neous competition, it is useful to give an intuition about the driving forces.
25Note that this strategy is similar to the "overtaking strategy" in Damiano and Li (2005),
although ours is not precisely an overtaking one.
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4. Charges are zero to the sellers
Consider a situation where platforms do not set positive charges to the sellers
but do to the buyers. A good example are software platforms that set access
charge to users and receive scarce revenues from developers that use their intel-
lectual property26 . Other examples are real state and travel agencies that set
charges only to the buyers. Some web pages that search for hotels and flights
charge prices only to the buyers. In these last examples, prices are charged if
a transaction takes place so that they do not completely fit with our model of
prices by access but they are a good illustration of the intuition.
We mantain the assumption that buyers singlehome and sellers are allowed
to multihome. This is a reasonable assumption for the case of the software
platforms, given that, in general, end-users use a single software platform in
their computers while developers can write for several platforms.
In this setting, platforms set prices to the buyers in the first stage, sellers
observe prices set to the buyers and infer buyers’ locations in the second stage,
finally, buyers observe prices, sellers’ locations, infer quality and choose the
platform they visit.
4.1 The buyers’ problem
Two active platforms with qi > qj . For each
¡
PBi , P
B
j
¢
and each
¡
NSi , N
S
j
¢
we define θ∗1 as the buyer who is indifferent between visiting platform i and
platform j, i.e.,
θ∗1 = min{θ, γ
¡
NSj −NSi
¢
(qi − qj) +
¡
PBi − PBj
¢
(qi − qj) } (6)
and θ∗0 as the indifferent buyer between visiting platform j and not visiting any
platform
θ∗0 = max{θ,
¡
PBj − γNSj
¢
qj
} (7)
Then, the number of buyers in platform i is NBi = 1 − F (θ∗1) and the corre-
sponding one in platform j is NBj = F (θ
∗
1)− F (θ∗0) .
Two active platforms with qi = qj . Two configurations may arise. If
γNSi − PBi > max{γNSj − PBi , 0}, then NBi = 1 and NBj = 0, whereas if
γNSi − PBi = γNSj − PBj > 0, then NBi = NBj = 12 .
A single active platform j with qj . There is a θ∗0 that represents the
indifferent buyer between visiting platform j and not visiting it and the mass
of buyers that go to the platform j is NBj = 1− F (θ∗0) .
26 In a survey about software platforms, Evans, et.al. (2004) remark: “Microsoft has earned
virtually all of its revenue from end-users...and thus earned only minor revenue from licensing
software tools”.
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4.2 The sellers’ problem
As in the previous section, at the second stage we consider symmetric equilibria
inside each seller group.
Proposition 12 Let
£
PB1 , P
B
2
¤
be the vector of prices set by the platforms to
the buyers. There is a unique Equilibrium in the sellers subgame, the global
multihoming equilibrium (location LMHM).
Proof. For both type of sellers the strategies of going to only one platform,
any of them, is dominated by the strategy of making multihoming.
4.3 The platforms’ problem
Proposition 13 There is a unique subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium, the
global multihoming equilibrium (location LMHM) with prices PB1 = P
B
2 = 0
and the number of buyers NB1 = N
B
2 =
1
2 .
Proof. Given that sellers multihome both platforms have the same quality
qM . The platform that sets the lower price gets the total market of buyers so
that Bertrand competition shows the result.
Note that once we have imposed prices zero to the side allowed to multi-
home, competition for the side that singlehomes is very strong and prices equal
marginal costs.
5. Welfare
Consider the total welfare as the sum of the buyers’ surplus, the sellers’ surplus
and the platforms’ profits. Denote with Λ the aggregate of the sellers’ surplus
and the platforms’ profits and note that, for any configuration where PB1 =
PB2 = 0 this is equal to,
Λ =
h
V
¡
qi
¢
+NBi
³
βH
´i
NSHi +N
B
i N
SL
i +h
V
¡
qj
¢
+NBj
³
βH
´i
NSHj +N
B
j N
SL
j .
We present the particular values that Λ takes in the configurations that we
have worked in.
In a dominant firm configuration this is equal to
ΛLiHi =
£
V
¡
qM
¢
+M
¤
x+ (1− x) , i 6=M.
In the case of a separating equilibrium the value of Λ is
ΛLiHj =
£
V
¡
qH
¢
+M
¤
x+ (1− x) (1− T1) , i 6= j 6=M, if βH > γ (1− 2x) and
ΛLiHj =
£
V
¡
qH
¢
+ T1
¤
x+ (1− x) (1− T1) , i 6= j 6=M, if βH < γ (1− 2x) .
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The particular value in a H multihoming equilibrium is
ΛLiHM =
£
V
¡
qH
¢
+ V
¡
qM
¢
+M
¤
x+ (1− x) (1− T2) , i 6=M.
Finally, the value of Λ in a global multihoming equilibrium is
ΛLMHM =
£
2V
¡
qM
¢
+M
¤
x+ (1− x) .
Note that, for any βH ,
ΛLiHM (i 6=M) > ΛLiHj (i 6= j 6=M) ,
this is that the aggregate profits of the sellers and platforms in a H multihoming
equilibrium is always higher than the corresponding to a separating equilibrium.
What also occurs is that the aggregate profits of the sellers’ and platforms
in an equilibrium configuration such as LMHM are, in any case, higher than in
a dominant firm equilibrium, that is,
ΛLMHM > ΛLiHi (i 6=M) .
Finally, note that whenever DqT2 >
1−x
x , the condition that is implied by
Dq
T1
≥
1−x
x ,
ΛLiHM (i 6=M) > ΛLMHM .
Now, consider the buyers’ surplus. Note that they obtain the same surplus
under an equilibrium configuration L1H1 (or L2H2) than under an equilibrium
configuration LMHM and this isZ θ
θ
£
uqM + γ
¤
f (u) du
where E (θ) is the expected value of θ.
Given that ΛLMHM > ΛLiHi (i 6=M), we conclude that welfare in a LMHM
configuration is always higher than in a LiHi (i 6=M) configuration (note that
this is only explained by the fact that high type sellers get a positive profit
2V
¡
qM
¢
in the case of LMHM and only V
¡
qM
¢
in the case of L1H1).
The buyers’ surplus of a configuration as L1H2 (or L2H1) is,Z γ(1−2x)
θ
£
uqL + γ (1− x)
¤
f (u) du+
Z θ
γ(1−2x)
£
uqH + γx
¤
f (u) du,
and the buyers’ surplus of a configuration as L1HM (or L2HM) is,Z γ
θ
£
uqM + γ
¤
f (u) du+
Z θ
γ
£
uqH + γx
¤
f (u) du.
If we compare the buyers’ surplus in both configurations, we note that buyers
of the type in the interval [θ, γ] are strictly better off under a configuration
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LiHM(i 6= M) than under one like LiHj (i 6= j 6=M) . In addition, buyers of
the type in the interval
£
γ, θ
¤
are indifferent between both configurations.
Taking into account that ΛLiHM (i 6= M) > ΛLiHj (i 6= j 6=M) , it follows
that a H multihoming configuration yields a higher total level of welfare than a
separating one.
From the comparison of the buyers’ surplus in a global multihoming config-
uration and the corresponding in a H multihoming one, we know that buyers
of the type in the interval [θ, γ] are indifferent while those of the type in the
interval
£
γ, θ
¤
will prefer the configuration LiHM(i 6=M).
We can conclude that under the condition DqT1 ≥
1−x
x , among the four con-
figurations that we have analysed, the one that generates the highest total level
of welfare is the H multihoming one.
Remember that prices to sellers equal to the marginal cost, i.e., PS1 = P
S
2 =
0, would lead to a global multihoming equilibrium with PB1 = P
B
2 = 0. It shows
that if the total price
¡
PSi + P
B
i
¢
set by the platforms equals the marginal cost,
the location that yields the highest welfare is not attained.
6. Conclusions
We have considered a model of competition between two-sided platforms where
each side of the market not only cares about the size of the other side, but also
about the type of its members. When buyers and sellers interact through the
platforms there are network and quality effects operating from one market to
the other. There is also an own side effect on the sellers’ side.
Despite the network effects and the ex-ante symmetric platforms, we find
equilibria with more than a single active platform. Moreover, in some of them
the resulting platforms are asymmetric in the prices they set, the type of cus-
tomers they house and the quality of the service they provide.
That sellers care about the type of other sellers in the platform is a crucial
assumption to have equilibria configurations with more than one platform. The
heterogeneity about quality on the buyers’ side plays also an important role
for the results, in particular, as to the existence of equilibria with asymmetric
platforms.
Because we have allowed the sellers to multihome, we find that they are
charged above the marginal cost, if not with monopoly prices.
Finally, the equilibrium where sellers separate by type is the most demanding
in terms of parameter values. The equilibrium where low type sellers singlehome
and high type multihome, so that one platform provides a high quality service
while the other one provides a medium level of quality, is the equilibrium that
yields the highest welfare, among the equilibria analyzed. Nevertheless, this
equilibrium may not always exist.
Appendix A
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Proof of proposition 2
Proof. We show that prices satisfying the conditions stated in proposition 2
imply an equilibrium configuration L1H2 by iterated elimination of dominated
strategies. Under prices PS1 ≤ 1 − T1 and PS2 ≤ V (qH) +M , strategies L0
and H0 are eliminated. Given that PS2 − PS1 ≥ T1, L1 dominates L2 and LM.
Finally, the best response to L1 by high type sellers is H2.
Proof of proposition 3
Proof. First, we prove that in any LMHM configuration of equilibrium, prices
satisfy min{T2, V (qM )} ≥ max{PS1 , PS2 } and PS1 + PS2 ≤ 1. The profits of the
sellers are UH1 +U
H
2 = 2V (q
M ) +M − PS1 − PS2 and UL1 +UL2 = 1− PS1 − PS2 ,
where PS1 + P
S
2 ≤ 1 and PS1 + PS2 ≤ 2V (qM ) +M must hold to ensure sellers’
participation. High type sellers will not deviate whenever
2V (qM ) +M − PS1 − PS2 ≥ max{V (qM ) +M − PS1 , V (qM ) +M − PS2 }
which requires PS1 ≤ V (qM ) and PS2 ≤ V (qM ) to hold. Similarly, low type
sellers will not deviate whenever
1− PS1 − PS2 ≥ max{(1− T2)− PS1 , (1− T2)− PS2 }
which requires PS1 ≤ T2 and PS2 ≤ T2. Thus, the first implication follows.
Now, by iterated elimination of dominated strategies we show that prices
such that min{T2, V (qM )} ≥ max{PS1 , PS2 } and PS1 + PS2 ≤ 1 ensure the exis-
tence of a global multihoming equilibrium as claimed. Trivially, strategies L0
and H0 are eliminated given that participation conditions are guaranteed. Given
that max{PS1 , PS2 } ≤ V (qM )}, HM dominates H1 and H2. Finally, the best re-
ply of sellers type L to HM strategy is LM under prices max{PS1 , PS2 } ≤ T2.
Proof of proposition 4
Proof. Initially, we prove that in any L1HM prices satisfy PS2 − PS1 ≥ 0,
PS1 ≤ min{1− T2, V (qM )} and T2 ≤ PS2 ≤ V (qH).
First, consider the case βH > γ (1− 2x) . In a H multihoming equilibrium
configuration as L1HM, sellers’ profits are given by UHM = V (q
H)+V (qM )+M−
PS1 −PS2 and UL1 = (1− T2)−PS1 . Participation constraints require PS1 ≤ 1−T2
and PS1 +P
S
2 ≤ V (qH)+V (qM )+M to hold. High type sellers will not deviate
whenever PS1 ≤ V (qM ) and PS2 ≤ V (qH) hold. Similarly, low type sellers will
not deviate whenever PS2 − PS1 ≥ 0 and PS2 ≥ T2 are satisfied.
Now, consider the case βH < γ (1− 2x) . The conditions for the low type
sellers do not change and high type sellers will not deviate whenever they do
not want to deviate to any of the singlehoming strategies, which requires PS1 ≤
V (qM ) +M − T1 and PS2 ≤ V (qH) to hold. Given that M > T1 when βH <
γ (1− 2x) , condition PS1 ≤ V (qM ) +M − T1 is implied by PS1 ≤ V (qM ).
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Now, we prove that under prices that satisfy PS2 − PS1 ≥ 0, PS1 ≤ min{1 −
T2, V (qM )} and T2 ≤ PS2 ≤ V (qH), only a L1HM equilibrium can arise. As
in previous proofs we obtain the result by iterated elimination of dominated
strategies. The strategies L0 and H0 are trivially eliminated. Given that PS1 ≤
V (qM ), HM dominates H2. And then, L1 dominates L2 and LM. Finally, the
best response of high type sellers to L1 is HM.
Thus, the conditions PS2 −PS1 ≥ 0, PS1 ≤ min{1−T2, V (qM )} and T2 ≤ PS2 ≤
V (qH) are necessary and sufficient to ensure the existence of an equilibrium
configuration L1HM, as claimed.
Proof of proposition 5
Proof. First, we prove that in any L1H1 equilibrium prices satisfy PS2 − PS1 ≥
Dq, PS1 ≤ min{1, V (qM ) +M} and PS2 ≥ V (qH).
Assume initially that βH > γ (1− 2x) . In a dominant firm equilibrium con-
figuration as L1H1, sellers’ profits are given by UH1 = V (q
M ) +M − PS1 and
UL1 = 1 − PS1 , where PS1 ≤ min{1, V (qM ) +M} ensure that profits above are
positive. High type sellers will not deviate to platform 2 whenever PS2 −PS1 ≥ Dq
and will not deviate to a multihome strategy whenever PS2 ≥ V (qH) is satisfied.
Similarly, low type sellers will not deviate whenever PS2 −PS1 ≥ −T1. Note that
this condition is implied by PS2 − PS1 ≥ Dq.
Assume now βH < γ (1− 2x) . The conditions for the low type sellers do not
change and high type sellers’ profits are given by UH1 = V (q
M )+T1−PS1 . They
will not deviate to platform 2 whenever PS2 −PS1 ≥ Dq−
h
F (γ (1− 2x)− F (βH)
i
holds. This condition is implied by PS2 −PS1 ≥ Dq. The condition of no deviation
to a multihome strategy is the same as in the case βH > γ (1− 2x) .
Now, we prove that under prices that satisfy PS2 −PS1 ≥ Dq, PS1 ≤ min{1, V (qM )+
M} and PS2 ≥ V (qH) only a L1H1 equilibrium will arise. The implication is
proved by iterated elimination of dominated strategies. As in previous proofs,
strategies L0 and H0 are trivially eliminated. Under prices PS2 − PS1 ≥ Dq,
strategy H1 dominates H2 and under condition PS2 ≥ V (qH), HM is dominated
by H1. Finally, given strategy H1, the best reply of low type sellers is L1.
Consequently, the necessary and sufficient conditions for a dominant plat-
form equilibrium configuration are PS2 − PS1 ≥ Dq, PS1 ≤ min{1, V (qM ) +M}
and PS2 ≥ V (qH) as claimed.
Appendix B
NE in mixed strategies of the sellers’ subgame
B1) We present the set of Nash Equilibria in mixed strategy of the sellers’
subgame when PS2 = V
¡
qH
¢
and the price of platform 1 belongs to the interval
1− T1 < PS1 < 1.
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Under these prices (since V
¡
qH
¢
> qH = 1), iterative elimination of domi-
nated strategies27 shows that low type sellers can only randomize between strate-
gies L1 and L0 and high type sellers can only randomize between strategies H1
and H2.
Denoting by a the probability of playing L1 and by y the probability of
playing H1, high sellers’ expected utility is given by
UH(a; y) = y
¡
V (qH)− aDq − PS1
¢
.
The best reply by H involves
BRH(a; (y, b)) =



y = 1 if V (qH)− aDq − PS1 > 0
y = 0 if V (qH)− aDq − PS1 < 0
c  [0, 1] if V (qH)− aDq − PS1 = 0.
And the low type sellers’ utility is given by
UL(a; y) = a
¡
1− PS1 − T1 + T1y
¢
,
and the corresponding best reply by low type sellers is
BRL(a; (y, b)) =



a = 1 if
¡
1− PS1 − T1 + T1y
¢
> 0
a = 0 if
¡
1− PS1 − T1 + T1y
¢
< 0
a ∈ [0, 1] if
¡
1− PS1 − T1 + T1y
¢
= 0.
Note that, given PS2 = V
¡
qH
¢
, whenever PS1 belongs to the interval
£
1, V
¡
qH
¢¤
,
the equilibrium configuration is L0H1. Similarly, if PS1 belongs to the inter-
val
£
V
¡
qM
¢
, 1− T1
¤
, the equilibrium configuration is L1H2. Consequently, we
only need to derive the set of NE in mixed strategies for the interval of prices
1− T1 < PS1 < 1.
Lemma 4: If 1 − T1 < PS1 < 1, high type sellers randomize between strate-
gies H1 and H2 with probabilities y = 1T1
¡
PS1 − (1− T1)
¢
and 1−y respectively,
whereas low type sellers randomize between strategies L1 and L0 with probabil-
ities a =
V (qH)−PS1
Dq
and 1 − a. The size of the market of platform 1 is given
by Ã
V
¡
qH
¢
− PS1
Dq
!
(1− x) +
µ
1
T1
¡
PS1 − (1− T1)
¢¶
x (8)
Proof. The value a =
V (qH)−PS1
Dq
leaves the high type sellers indifferent
between strategies H1 and H2. Analogously, the value y = 1T1
¡
PS1 − (1− T1)
¢
leaves the low type sellers indifferent between strategies L1 and L0.
Note that, whenever DqT1 ≥
1−x
x , markets defined by equation (9), (10), (11)
and (8) are non-decreasing in prices.
27We find that L1 dominates LM, then H1 weakly dominates HM, L0 dominates L2 and
finally, H2 dominates H0.
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B2) We present the set of Nash Equilibria in mixed strategy of the sellers’
subgame when PS1 = 1− T1 and the price of platform 2 belongs to the interval
VM ≤ PS2 ≤ 1.
The set of equilibria is computed assuming that LM is a dominated strategy
(it occurs if 1− T1 > T1 or if V (qM ) > T1).
In addition, this set of equilibria exists when parameters satisfy also the
following conditions: 2 (1− T1) < V (qH) + V (qM ) < 2− T1.
We denote by a the probability of the low type sellers playing strategy L1 and
consequently (1− a) the probability of L2. We denote by y, b and c = 1− y− b
the probabilities of the high type sellers playing strategies H1, H2 and HM,
respectively.
Given PS1 = 1− T1, the high type sellers’ expected utility is given by
UH(a; (y, b)) = M + y
¡
T1 + V (qH)(1− a) + aV
¡
qM
¢
− 1
¢
+
b
¡
V
¡
qM
¢
(1− a) + aV (qH)− p2
¢
+ c
¡
V
¡
qM
¢
+ V (qH) + T1 − 1− p2
¢
= M + yz1 + bz2 + cz3
The best reply by H involves
BRH(a; (y, b)) =



y = 1 if z1 > max(0, z2, z3)
b = 1 if z2 > max(0, z1, z3)
c = 1 if z3 > max(0, z1, z2).
Given PS1 = 1− T1, the high type sellers’ expected utility is given by
UL(a; (y, b)) = a (yT1 + T1 − bT1 − 1 + p2)− yT1 + 1− T2 + T2y + T2b− p2
and the corresponding best reply by low type sellers is
BRL(a; (y, b)) =



a = 1 if (1 + y − b)T1 − 1 + p2 > 0
a = 0 if (1 + y − b)T1 − 1 + p2 < 0
a ∈ [0, 1] if (1 + y − b)T1 − 1 + p2 = 0.
Using the best reply functions above, we next show the set of Nash equilibria
in mixed strategies.
Lemma 5: Along the interval V (qH) + V (qM ) − (1− T1) < PS2 ≤ 1 there
exists a set of mixed strategy Nash Equilibria where low type sellers randomize
between strategies L1 and L2 and high type sellers randomize between strategies
H1 and H2 with probabilities a =
³
1
2
Dq+P
S
2 −(1−T1)
Dq
´
, y =
³
1
2
1−PS2
T1
´
and b =
1− y. The platform 2’s market in this interval is equal toµ
1
2
Dq − PS2 + (1− T1)
Dq
¶
(1− x) +
µ
1
2
T1 − (1− T1) + PS2
T1
¶
x (9)
Proof. If V (qH)+V (qM )−(1− T1) < PS2 , then z3 < 0 so that strategy HM
is dominated. At a =
³
1
2
Dq+P
S
2 −(1−T1)
Dq
´
type H sellers are indifferent between
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H1 and H2. Similarly, y =
³
1
2
1−PS2
T1
´
is the probability that makes low type
sellers indifferent between L1 and L2. The size of the market follows trivially
from the probabilities above.
Lemma 6: Along the interval (1− T1) < PS2 < V (qH) + V (qM )− (1− T1),
sellers type L randomize between strategies L1 and L2 whereas sellers type H
randomize between strategies H2 and HM with probabilities a = (
V (qH)−(1−T1))
Dq
,
b =
³
1
T1
¡
PS2 − (1− T1)
¢´
and c = 1− b.28 Platform 2’s market in this interval
is equal to Ã
(1− T1)− V
¡
qM
¢
Dq
!
(1− x) + x (10)
Proof. At a = (
V (qH)−(1−T1))
Dq
, type H sellers are indifferent between their
three possible strategies as z1 = z2 = z3. The values that leave sellers type
L indifferent between L1 and L2 are b =
³
1
T1
¡
PS2 − (1− T1)
¢´
and c = 1 − b,
which trivially follows from BRL(a; (y, b)).
Lemma 7: If VM < PS2 < (1− T1) low type sellers randomize between
strategies L1 and L2 with a = (
PS2 −V (q
M))
Dq
, and type H sellers randomize be-
tween strategies H1 and HM with probabilities y = (
1−T1−PS2 )
T1
and c = 1− y.29
The size of the market of platform 2 in this interval of prices isÃ¡
V
¡
qH
¢
− PS2
¢
Dq
!
(1− x) +
µ
T1 − (1− T1) + PS2
T1
¶
x (11)
Proof. Whenever the value of a is smaller than
V (qH)−(1−T1)
Dq
, the best
response of the high type sellers is b = 0. The value y = (
1−T1−PS2 )
T1
leaves low
sellers indifferent between strategies L1 and L2. Platform 2’s market trivially
follows.
28 If the price is PS2 = V (q
H)+V (qM )− (1− T1) , type L sellers randomize between L1 and
L2 whereas type H sellers randomize with positive weights in their three strategies.
29 If PS2 = (1− T1) there is a set of NE in mixed strategies where sellers type L randomize
between L1 and L2 with probabilities a ∈
µ
(1−T1)−V (qM)
Dq
,
V (qH)−(1−T1)
Dq
¶
whereas high
type sellers play the strategy HM.
If PS2 = V
¡
qM
¢
type L sellers play strategy L2 and high type sellers randomize between
strategies H1 and HM with probabilities y ∈ [0, (1−T2−P
S
2 )
T1
).
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Appendix C
Proof of proposition 7
Proof. We first show that there is no profitable deviation by platform 2 given
PS∗1 = min{T2, V (qM )}.
At the candidate equilibrium platform 2’s profits are Π∗2 = min{T2, V (qM )}
provided thatmin{T2, V (qM )} ≤ 12 , which ensures low type sellers participation.
As shown in proposition 3 no other price by platform 2 will yield a higher
profit among the prices that induce global multihoming.
Consequently, we only need to check for deviations to a higher price that
would induce sellers’ location L1HM provided that PS2 < V (q
H). Such a devia-
tion is not profitable if and only if
PS2 x < min{T2, V (qM )}.
As PS2 < V (q
H), a sufficient condition to deter this deviation is given by
V (qH)x < min{T2, V (qM )}. If T2 > V (qM ), condition V (qH)x < V (qM ) is
guaranteed by the concavity of V (qi). If T2 < V (qM ), the necessary condition
is V (qH)x < T2.
Similar arguments apply to platform 1 deviations which show our claim.
Proof of proposition 9
Proof. At the candidate equilibrium platforms’ profits are Π∗1 = V (q
M ) and
Π∗2 = V (q
H)x.
We start analyzing deviations by platform 2 given PS∗1 = V (q
M ). The set of
possible deviations can be divided into three groups:
1) Deviations to prices that guarantee a location of sellers L1HM. These
deviations are not profitable as PS∗2 is the best price that platform 2 can set
among those that yield locations L1HM.
2) Deviations to a lower price PS2 ≤ V (qM ) to attract the low type sellers in
order to get the location L2HM.
The deviation is not profitable whenever
V (qM ) ≤ V (qH)x. (12)
Note that this condition contradicts concavity of function V (qi), and only can
be satisfied if and only if V (qi) is linear, so that V (qM ) = V (qH)x.
3) Deviations to a higher price PS2 > V (q
H). These are never profitable
deviations given that these prices would lead to a location of sellers L1H1 that
implies Π∗2 = 0.
Now, we analyze deviations by platform 1 given PS∗2 = V (q
H). There are
three groups of potential deviations:
1) Deviations to prices that guarantee a location of sellers L1HM. These
deviations are not profitable because, PS∗1 is the maximum price that platform
1 can charge.
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2) Deviations to a lower price PS1 < V (q
M ). Given that platform 1 has the
total number of sellers, setting a lower price will never be a profitable deviation.
3) Deviations to a higher price. Three relevant intervals arise:
Interval 1: V
¡
qM
¢
< PS1 ≤ 1− T1.
Any price of this interval would lead to location of sellers L1H2, so that
platform 1 will not deviate if and only if
V
¡
qM
¢
> (1− T1) (1− x) . (13)
Interval 2: 1− T1 < PS1 < 1
At prices of this interval sellers play mixed strategies in equilibrium (see
B2 in appendix B). In particular, platform 1 gets the low type sellers with
probability a and gets the high type sellers with probability y. Platform 1’s
market is given by (8) that under the condition DqT1 ≥
1−x
x is non-decreasing
in PS1 . Consequently profits at these prices are bounded above by the profits at
PS1 = 1. No deviation will take place if
V
¡
qM
¢
>
Ã
V
¡
qH
¢
− 1
Dq
!
(1− x) + x (14)
Interval 3: A price in the interval 1 ≤ PS1 ≤ V
¡
qH
¢
would lead to a location
L0H1 (see B1 in appendix B) and platform 1 would not deviate if
V (qM ) ≥ V (qH)x. (15)
Note that (15) implies (14) , as V
¡
qH
¢
> 1. Furthermore, (12) and (15) can
only hold if V (qM ) = V (qH)x.
Consequently, if (12), (13) and (15) hold then, there is a Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium configuration with prices PS∗1 = V (q
M ) and PS∗2 = V (q
H) and
location L1HM as we claimed.
Proof of proposition 11
Proof. At the candidate equilibrium platform’s profits areΠ∗1 = (1− T1) (1− x)
and Π∗2 =
¡
V (qH) +M
¢
x.
We first analyze deviations by platform 2 given PS∗1 = 1− T1.These devia-
tions can be divided into three groups:
1) Deviations to prices that guarantee sellers’ separation, i.e., to prices in
the interval [1,Dq + 1− T1] . These deviations are not profitable as PS∗2 is the
monopoly price.
2) Platform 2 can deviate to a lower price PS2 ≤ 1 to attract more sellers
and obtain higher benefits. There are 3 intervals of prices to be considered. In
all of them sellers play mixed strategies in equilibrium (see B2 in Appendix B):
Interval 1: V (qH) + V (qM )− (1− T1) < PS2 ≤ 1
As shown in lemma 4 of appendix B, at these prices low type sellers go to
platform 2 with probability (1− a) and high type sellers with probability b,
hence the market of platform 2 in this interval is (9) .
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Interval 2: (1− T1) < PS2 ≤ V (qH) + V (qM )− (1− T1)
At these prices lemma 5 shows that platform 2 gets all the high type sellers
and gets the low type with probability (1− a) , so that the market of platform
2 is (10) . Note that (10) is higher than (9) .
A sufficient condition for no deviation to any price in the two previous in-
tervals by platform 2 is to evaluate profits at PS2 = 1. The condition that arises
is ¡
V (qH) +M
¢
x ≥
Ã
(1− T1)− V
¡
qM
¢
Dq
!
(1− x) + x (16)
Interval 3: V (qM ) < PS2 ≤ (1− T1)
At these prices from lemma 6 we know that platform 2 gets the low type sell-
ers with probability (1− a) and the high type sellers with probability (1− y) .The
relevant market of platform 2 for this interval is given by (11). If the market in
this interval is non-decreasing in PS2 , i.e., condition
Dq
T1
≥ 1−xx holds, a sufficient
condition for no deviation arises. If Π∗2 ≥
£
Market
¡
PS2 = 1− T1
¢¤
(1− T1) ,
i.e.,
¡
V (qH) +M
¢
x ≥
"Ã
V
¡
qH
¢
− (1− T1)
Dq
!
(1− x) + x
#
(1− T1) (17)
If PS2 ≤ V (qM ) the condition that avoids any deviation to a location L2HM
is ¡
V (qH) +M
¢
x ≥ V (qM ) (18)
3) Deviations to a higher price PS2 ≥ Dq + 1− T1. These deviations are not
profitable deviations given that they would lead to a location of sellers L1H1
that implies Π2 = 0.
Now, consider deviations by platform 1 given PS∗2 = V (q
H) + M. These
deviations can be divided into three groups:
1) Deviations to prices that guarantee sellers’ separation, i.e., to prices in the
interval
£
V (qH) +M −Dq, V (qH) +M − T1
¤
. These deviations are not prof-
itable as PS∗2 is the monopoly price.
2) Platform 1 can deviate to a lower price PS1 ≤ V (qH)+M−Dq = V (qM )+
M. These prices would lead to a location of sellers L1H1 that implies Π1 =
V (qM ) +M. This deviation is not profitable whenever
V (qM ) +M < (1− T1) (1− x) (19)
3) Deviations to a higher price PS1 ≥ V (qH) +M − T1. The best deviation
can do is attrating type H sellers while type L are lost (location L0H1). The
maximum price that it gets is PS1 = V (q
H) +M − ε and platform 1 will not
deviate if and only if ¡
V (qH) +M
¢
x ≤ (1− T1) (1− x) (20)
Note that (17) and(20)are compatible if and only if (1−T1)−V (q
M )
Dq
> x1−x
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Note that (16) and(20)are compatible if and only if (1−T1)(Dq−1)+V (q
M )
Dq
>
x
1−x .
Condition (20) is compatible with V (qH) > 1 if and only if (1−T1)(1+M) >
x
1−x .
The common feature of the conditions are that x must be sufficiently low
and (1− T1) sufficiently high to hold.
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